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Abstract
We consider renegotiation of social earnings insurance arrangements by majority voting
in an economy where ex-ante identical individuals make unobservable private investments in
education. We show that voting-based renegotiation can result in a higher expected level of
investment in comparison to the case where social insurance is determined by an appointed
social planner. We also ¯nd that, with voting-based renegotiation, the availability of costly
ex-post information about private investment can help overcome commitment problems.
These ¯ndings call into question the practice of using a representative-consumer approach
when modelling dynamic policy problems in large economies.
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1 Introduction
In spite of the recent literature stress on political mechanisms of collective choice, the traditional
social planning approach to the analysis of policymaking is still widely employed as an analytical
short-cut for studying environments where individuals are homogeneous, or where heterogeneity
can reasonably be abstracted from. In this paper we argue that, when applied to the study of
dynamic situations, the social planning/representative-agent paradigmmay not be an innocuous
short-cut. Speci¯cally, we show that, when compared to a scenario where policy is chosen by
a social planner, explicit renegotiation of collective choices by majority rule in a homogeneous
economy can yield markedly di®erent conclusions with respect to the e®ects of a lack of policy
commitment.
We consider an environment where individuals face idiosyncratic earnings risk|which they
can insure against by means of a collectively agreed social insurance scheme|and where the
probability of experiencing favourable earnings outcomes can be increased by means of private,
costly investment in education. In such setting, the provision of social insurance runs against a
moral-hazard problem: if full earnings insurance is provided, individual incentives to invest are
eliminated. Then, if social insurance can be pre-committed to|before individuals make their
investment choices|the standard response to moral hazard would be to strike an appropriate
balance between the two goals of inducing e±cient educational e®orts and providing e±cient
risk sharing: in the interpretation of a progressive income tax as earnings insurance, incom-
plete insurance would translate into a marginal income tax of less than one-hundred percent.1
However, the fact that returns to education appear with long lags opens up a problem of a
very di®erent nature: it leaves ample time for renegotiation of social insurance arrangements.
The renegotiation problem arises from the fact that the ex-ante e±cient policy requires ex-post
ine±cient risk-sharing, i.e. less-than-full insurance; but once investments are completed there
may no longer be any reason for providing incomplete insurance. Thus, a social planner, unan-
imously appointed ex ante to select insurance after private education choice are completed but
before earnings uncertainty is resolved, would always opt for full insurance, which would then
drive education investments to zero.
But while in an economy where policy commitment is possible and where agents are homo-
geneous the policy chosen by a social planner is the same as that favoured by a majority, such
equivalence is lost when the social contract can be renegotiated. This is because, even though
individuals are identical ex ante, heterogeneity in investment choices can arise at the interim
stage, both in equilibrium and out of equilibrium. Then, if interim renegotiation takes place
by majority voting, with individuals voting over anonymous insurance schemes, it will be in
1See Sinn (1996) for a recent discussion of the tradeo®, in income tax design, between providing social
insurance and maintaining appropriate incentives to invest in education.
1
the majority's interest to exploit any interim heterogeneity and vote for a scheme that entails a
transfer of resources to themselves. This, in turn, will a®ect individual incentives ex ante, and
hence the outcomes that can be supported when pre-commitment is not feasible.
Whether or not public information can be valuable also depends on how renegotiation takes
place. When interim social insurance choices are made by a social planner, information about
private choice is of little consequence. For example, a utilitarian planner selecting a social
insurance scheme at the interim stage would condition taxes and transfers on e®ort, when
observable ex post, only to the extent that e®ort a®ects an individual's ex-post marginal utility
of income; such conditioning would, however, not generally induce e±cient investment choices.
Since ex post the planner will not have any reason to punish an agent who has failed to take
a desired action, whether or not the action can be observed has little bearing on individual
incentives.2 Consequently, a social planner would not be willing to incur a cost in order to
acquire information, at neither the ex-ante nor the interim stage.
On the other hand, with voting-based renegotiation a majority's ability to a®ect a transfer
to themselves through the social insurance scheme, and the implications this has for ex-ante
incentives, will depend on the degree of ex-post observability of private choices; it may therefore
be in the majority's interest to procure public information even when it is costly to do so. This
conclusion may also apply to scenarios where pre-commitment to an information technology is
infeasible and where the collective choice to invest in public information must be made concur-
rently with social insurance choices. Although in this case investment in public information can
no longer be used strategically to support an ex-ante desirable outcome, it may still be in the
interest of the interim majority to invest in information, which can in turn help support more
e®ort in comparison with a social planning outcome. Thus, with voting-based renegotiation,
the mere availability of technologies for enhancing the public observability of private choices
can help overcome commitment problems.
There is a small but growing literature on dynamically consistent redistributive taxation in
the presence of private education choices. Most contributors to this literature have focused on
the problems that arise when policy is chosen by a benevolent government.3 By our focus on
2In general, there is no presumption that public information about private choices is a substitute for com-
mitment; on the contrary, it can be the source of the problem. For example, the investment hold-up problem
associated with capital taxes (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; more recently, Boadway and Keen, 1998) would not
be present if investments were not observable (and therefore not taxable).
3Boadway, Marceau, and Marchand (1996) have considered the dynamically consistent policy choice of a
benevolent government in a model with ex-ante heterogeneous individuals and productivity-enhancing human
capital investments. They show that an inability to commit to an income tax system may lead to serious
ine±ciencies, which may make an education policy useful. Konrad (1999) examines a moral-hazard model with
ex-ante homogeneous individuals; an individual's wage rate is uncertain, but the probability of a favourable
realization can be increased by human capital investment. Konrad argues that incomplete information on the
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interim determination of insurance in a moral-hazard environment our paper is also related to
the literature on renegotiation in dynamic contract theory.4
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our model. In Section 3 we analyze
social insurance choices made by a utilitarian social planner. In Section 4 we examine the case
where collective choices are made by majority voting, considering, in turn, the case where pre-
commitment to an investment in information is feasible and the case where it is not. Section
5 discusses some extensions and concludes. Proofs of results (unless outlined in the text) are
provided in an appendix.
2 Education, Social Insurance, and Information Structures
Consider an economy with a continuum of agents (of unit measure) living for two periods. In the
¯rst period|the ex-ante stage|each agent chooses an education or e®ort level h 2 fh1; h2g,
where h2 > h1. In the second period|the ex-post stage|agents work, inelastically supplying
one unit of labour. Earnings in the second period are a random variable w 2 W ´ fw1; w2g,
with w2 > w1, whose probability distribution is independent across consumers but is conditional
on ¯rst-period e®ort. Speci¯cally, denoting the probability of a realization wi given e®ort h
k
by ¼ki 2 (0; 1), i; k = 1; 2, we shall assume that ¼22 > ¼12, i.e. a higher level of ¯rst-period
e®ort raises the probability of a favourable second-period earnings outcome. One possible
interpretation of this assumption is as follows: with h representing education investment, a
higher level of education could reveal information about an individual's suitability to certain
occupations and reduce the probability of an occupational mismatch. Henceforth, an agent's
type in the second period will refer to her ¯rst-period e®ort choice, i.e. a type-k agent is an
agent who has exerted e®ort hk, k = 1; 2.
Even if all agents exert high e®ort, there will be residual idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty,
which in principle can be eliminated by putting in place a social insurance scheme before
part of the government can be instrumental in preserving incentives for investment in human capital. A related
paper is Andersson and Konrad (2000) which considers how globalization and tax competition can restrict
redistributive taxation and thereby boost incentives for human capital investments, when there is a potential
time-inconsistency problem. Poutvaara (1999) considers a moral-hazard model where individuals vote for a
proportional income tax after human capital investments are completed but prior to the individuals learning the
outcome of their investment. He shows that the e®ect of taxation on education, in comparison with a situation
with no taxation, is ambiguous. Another related paper is Pearce and Stacchetti (1997); their analysis does not
consider human capital investment, but it does consider the choice of redistributive taxes in the presence of
moral hazard in labour contracts.
4Our paper is especially related to the type of problem described in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), who
demonstrate that the possibility of renegotiation in a standard moral-hazard/principal-agent problem can create
an endogenous adverse-selection problem by inducing the agent to randomize over actions. See Dewatripont and
Maskin (1990) for a survey.
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any uncertainty is resolved. Typically, social insurance will consist of a set of earnings-based
redistributive taxes and transfers, although for the purpose of our analysis it is convenient
to represent social insurance directly in terms of state-contingent consumption levels. Under
such a scheme, consumption can be conditioned on earnings, which are assumed to be fully
observable, as well as any other observable signals which are received ex post along with earnings
realizations, and which may be correlated with e®ort. Such signals can be formalized as a signal
structure ¾ ´ (S; f; q), where S is a ¯nite signal space, fkj is the probability that a type-k agent
sends the signal sj 2 S, and q ¸ 0 (hereafter denoted as q¾) is the per-capita cost of having
the signal structure in place. We shall also write S(h) to denote the support of the signal
distribution given e®ort h for a given ¾|i.e. the smallest subset of S that has probability one
given e®ort h. Signal structures can be thought of as being exogenous, or, alternatively, as being
the result of a costly investment in collective infrastructure, put in place in order to provide
public information about private education choices.5 The set of feasible signal structures, or
the economy's information technology, denoted §, is assumed to contain the `uninformative'
or null signal structure ¾0|the no-information case|which can be represented by a signal
space containing a single signal sent with probability one irrespectively of the agent's type; ¾0
is assumed to be costless, i.e. q¾0 = 0, while all other signal structures are assumed to have
strictly positive cost.
For a given signal structure, an insurance contract can be described as a mapping C :
W £ S ! R+, assigning a consumption level C(wi; sj) ´ cij to each possible earnings/signal
combination (wi; sj).
6 In principle, more than one contract may be o®ered as part of a social
insurance scheme, with each agent choosing which contract to underwrite; a social insurance
system can thus be generally described as a menu of contracts, C ´ (C1; : : : ; Ct; : : :). Since the
social insurance system is put in place before any signals are received or earnings outcomes are
realized|when agents are indistinguishable from each other|we shall require that the scheme
be anonymous: all agents must be o®ered the same menu of contracts.
Also, in order to be feasible, a social insurance system must satisfy an aggregate resource
constraint. Since the economy is large and all risk is idiosyncratic, there is no aggregate
uncertainty; thus, we can simply require that the economy's resource constraint must hold
in expectations. Let ¹wk ´ Pi ¼kiwi denote the expected income for a type-k agent. In the
subsequent analysis all agents of the same type will always pick the same contract. Then, if µk
denotes the fraction of type-k agents in the economy and Ck is the contract picked by type-k
5Public monitoring mechanisms such as public testing of educational attainments can be thought of as a
special case of this more general speci¯cation.
6Although our analysis will assume that consumption is bounded from below, the nonnegativity constraint is
largely arbitrary. One may alternatively assume that consumption can never be less than a certain given level
c 6= 0.
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Agents derive utility from consumption and disutility from e®ort and from the cost associ-
ated with any signal structure in place: given consumption c, e®ort hk, and a signal structure
¾, an agent obtains utility u(c)¡ gk ¡ q¾, where u0 > 0 and u00 < 0, and where gk denotes the
cost associated with e®ort hk. Preferences are thus assumed to be fully separable both in the
cost of e®ort and in the per-person cost of adopting a signal structure.
Agents' choices in this model consist of individual choices|over e®ort|and collective
choices|over the adoption of signal structures and social insurance schemes.7 If policy choices
could be made before private education choices, then the manner in which collective choices are
made would not matter: individuals could appoint a social planner or vote directly over policy
(or indeed bargain in some other way as long as the bargaining process satis¯es anonymity). In
all cases, the chosen policy would maximize the expected payo® of the representative individual,
and, in all cases, the outcome would be optimal given the available information technology. It
is unclear, however, how the individuals could commit ex ante (when young) to a certain social
insurance scheme that will apply when old. But if private choices precede insurance choices, the
procedure through which collective choices are made matters. This is because, even when indi-
viduals are ex-ante identical, after private choices are made|at the interim stage|individuals
can be of di®erent types. Consequently, the way in which heterogeneous preferences are rec-
onciled at the interim stage determines which equilibrium outcomes can be supported. In the
next section, we start by brie°y considering the scenario where collective choices are made by a
social planner. The subsequent sections will turn to the case where collective choices are made
by majority voting.
3 Renegotiation under Social Planning
Suppose that a utilitarian social planner is appointed at the ex-ante stage (before the agents
choose e®ort) to select a social insurance system at the interim stage (after the agents have
exerted e®orts but before any uncertainty is resolved). This scenario comprises two subcases:
the planner may either be able to commit to a signal structure at the ex-ante stage (ex-ante
adoption), or be unable to do so, implying that the signal structure will have to be determined
at the interim stage along with the social insurance system (interim adoption). As we shall see,
although the analysis of the two cases di®er slightly the outcome is the same: in equilibrium all
7We choose to focus on social insurance as an example of a social contract that may be vulnerable to renego-
tiation, abstracting from the question of whether earnings insurance could be provided by private markets.
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agents choose low e®ort, the planner does not invest in any costly signal structure and provides
all agents with full insurance.8
Throughout our analysis, we shall restrict our attention to scenarios where neither low nor
high e®ort is a dominant action for the individuals irrespectively of social insurance arrange-
ments; speci¯cally, we shall assume that




An e±cient outcome thus involves full insurance and high e®ort, but agents prefer low e®ort
with full insurance to high e®ort with no insurance. This generates a moral-hazard problem
since insurance reduces the agents' incentives to exert e®ort.
Since agents are ex-ante identical we will focus on symmetric equilibria. Agents may, how-
ever, randomize over e®ort levels, choosing e®ort level hk with probability µk. Since the economy
is large, µk will also represent the fraction of type-k individuals present in the economy at the
interim stage.9
Consider ¯rst the case where the social planner can commit to a signal structure at the ex-
ante stage. The planner ¯rst chooses a signal structure ¾ 2 §, which is observed by everyone,
after which agents choose e®ort; then the planner|without observing private choices|chooses
a social insurance system; ¯nally, signals and earnings are realized and taxes and transfers are
carried out. Since there are at most two agent types, we can without loss of generality restrict










denote the expected utility of consumption for a type-k agent given the contract C. The
planner's objective can then be written asX
k
µk(vk(Ck)¡ gk)¡ q¾;(4)
where Ck is the contract intended for type-k agents. The set of relevant constraints for the
planner's problem always includes the budget constraint (1); interim participation constraints
8The planner could in principle randomize over signal structures, but this will not a®ect the outcome; to keep
the analysis simple we will ignore random signal structures in this section.
9Symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria in this context can equivalently be interpreted as asymmetric pure-
strategy equilibria (note that since individuals must be indi®erent between any two e®ort levels adopted with
non-zero probability in equilibrium, ex-ante expected welfare in equilibrium will be the same across individuals
independently of which interpretation we choose). Moreover, Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) show that a mixed-
strategy equilibrium of the type considered here, where the agents randomize over e®ort levels, can be `puri¯ed'
by allowing the agents to have some small amount of private information about their e®ort costs.
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and interim self-selection constraints requiring that each agent type opt for the contract that
is meant for her type:
vk(Ck) ¸ vk(Ck0); k 6= k0:(6)
To characterize subgame perfect equilibria of this game, we can proceed by backward in-
duction, considering ¯rst a subgame in which ¾ is given. Since the planner has no information
about private choices when deciding on a social insurance system, the appropriate equilibrium
concept to apply to such subgame is, strictly speaking, Nash equilibrium. Note, however, that
when the distribution of types is degenerate, menus containing `extreme' contracts can be op-
timal since these have no direct e®ect on the planner's maximand and resource constraint;
this in turn can give rise to nonintuitive equilibria which rely on the planner playing a weakly
dominated strategy.10 Such equilibria are degenerate in the sense that they are not robust to
small deviations from the individuals' equilibrium strategies, and can be ruled out by applying
a simple perfection argument whereby each agent is required to adopt each possible e®ort level
with an arbitrarily small but positive probability ";11 a Nash equilibrium of the unconstrained
game equilibrium is then said to be perfect if it is the limit of a sequence of Nash equilibria for
the constrained game as " approaches zero.
Lemma 1 Conditional on any ex-ante adopted signal structure ¾ 2 §, the unique perfect Nash
equilibrium in the continuation game involves the utilitarian social planner choosing a single
full-insurance contract, cij = ¹w
1 for all i; j, and all agents choosing low e®ort with probability
one.
Given Lemma 1 it is trivial to see that the planner will have no reason to invest in a costly
signal structure at the ex-ante stage; hence the unique equilibrium of the game involves all
agents choosing low e®ort and the planner adopting the null signal structure with probability
one and providing full insurance.
10In particular, if the planner believes that no agent has chosen low e®ort, then her best response is to o®er
full insurance; however, she can o®er a low consumption level on any signal that is not compatible with high
e®ort. If ¾ is such that a low-e®ort agent sends a distinct signal with a su±ciently high probability (i.e., if ¾ is
su±ciently revealing for type-1 individuals in the terminology introduced in the next section) then the agents'
best response is to choose high e®ort. Hence there may exist, conditional on ¾, a Nash equilibrium where all
agents choose high e®ort. But this nonintuitive equilibrium relies on the planner being absolutely `con¯dent'
that no agent has chosen low e®ort.
11This corresponds to the notion of an `"-constrained' equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1989), except that
we do not require the planner to play a mixed strategy.
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What then if the planner could not commit to a signal structure at the ex-ante stage, but
were only able to adopt one at the interim stage along with the social insurance system? In this
case, as in previous one, the planner's objective when choosing social insurance would be to
equalize consumption levels across agents|which it can do without having any information on
private choices|and make this common consumption level as large as possible; hence, again,
the planner would always o®er a single full-insurance contract and would never adopt any
costly signal structure in the interim because this would only reduce the available resources
to be distributed. Given that no information about private choices will be procured and that
full insurance will be provided, no agent has any incentive to exert any e®ort. In other words,
the outcome is the same irrespectively of whether the social planner can commit to a signal
structure or not. The agents know that the planner will always want to equalize consumption
ex post and hence any threat to condition consumption on signals will be empty.
Proposition 1 If a utilitarian social planner selects a signal structure, either ex ante or in
the interim along with a social insurance system, the unique perfect Nash equilibrium involves
the planner choosing the uninformative signal structure, ¾0, all agents choosing low e®ort, h1,
with probability one, and the planner o®ering a single full-insurance contract with cij = ¹w
1 for
all i; j.
4 Renegotiation by Majority Rule
As previously noted, even starting from a scenario with identical individuals, after private e®ort
choices have been made there may be population heterogeneity. Then, how di®erent preferences
are reconciled in the interim may be relevant for individual incentives to exert e®ort, and hence
for the level of private e®ort that can be supported in equilibrium.
Note that the insurance-based interpretation of social-welfare-maximizing planning choices
will cease to apply in the presence of interim renegotiation; if a planner is appointed before
private e®ort choices are made but is to make social insurance choices at the interim stage, the
relevant objective for the planner at that stage will not coincide with the expected utility of
the representative agent, but will feature as its argument the interim expected utilities of the
(possibly heterogeneous) individuals. There may be no disagreement among the ex-ante identi-
cal individuals about which form this objective should take|although utilitarianism would no
longer be a natural choice|but it is hard to imagine a scenario where collective choices should
follow this route: if pre-commitment is possible with respect to the identity and objective of
a planner, then it should also be possible to directly pre-commit to a certain social insurance
scheme. Interim majority voting over social insurance schemes seems to be a more natural
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procedure in a large economy where bargaining is infeasible.12
Independently of whether or not commitment to a signal structure is feasible, in order to
study individual voting choices we shall need to characterize the contract menu that maximizes
the continuation utility of each agent type for each possible distribution of e®ort types and
each ¾ 2 §. Since there are at most two voter types present at the interim stage, each voter
can do no better than by voting for the menu that maximizes her own continuation utility;
in other words, sincere voting is always a weakly undominated strategy.13 It follows that the
contract menu selected by majority rule in the interim will always be one that is favoured by
the majority type.
We can again, without loss of generality, assume that each agent votes for a menu consisting
of two contracts|one intended for her own type and one intended for the other type. Let the
menu favoured by type-k agents be denoted by Ck ´ (Ckk; Ckk0) (the ¯rst superscript indicates
the type casting the vote and the second superscript the type the contract is intended for). Since
e®ort is private information|no signals have yet been observed|the menu that is optimal for
type-k individuals must induce agents to self-select according to their e®ort type. For the
time being we shall assume that individuals cannot opt out of social insurance|the e®ects of
participation constraints will be discussed later. Given a certain signal structure ¾ and beliefs
µ = (µ1; µ2) concerning the composition of the population, the optimal menu from the point of
view of a type-k agent is then a solution to
max
Ck




)¡ vk0(Ckk00) ¸ 0; k0 6= k00:(7)
The latter set of constraints state that each type k0, k0 = 1; 2 should prefer the contract meant
for her type, Ckk
0
, to that intended for the other type, Ckk
00
. Note that nonsatiation implies that
the budget constraint will always be binding at an optimum.14 The problem is one of provision
of insurance under adverse selection with two risk groups. The case of a monopolistic insurer
facing two risk groups has been studied by Stiglitz (1977) and the corresponding competitive
markets case by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). The structure of the problem here di®ers from
that in a buyer-seller relationship in that agents are voting directly over a menu of contracts
that apply to themselves, each agent type aiming at maximizing utility for her own type;
indeed, Problem (7) can be viewed as characterizing a particular constrained Pareto-e±cient
12In a representative democracy, social insurance choices could be made in the interim by a previously appointed
policymaker, but there is no reason to believe that such a policymaker would formulate her interim choices on
the basis of a social planning objective.
13For simplicity, the rest of our discussion will focus on strategies featuring sincere voting, even when such
behaviour is only an undominated best response in equilibrium (as is the case for minority-type voters).
14Nonsatiation implies that it is always possible to use any additional resources to raise everyone's level of
consumption without tightening any of the self-selection constraints.
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allocation, the allocation that maximizes the utility for type k. Denote such a solution by
Ck(µ;¾) = (Ckk(µ;¾); Ckk0(µ;¾)).
Two observations can immediately be made about the solution to Problem (7). First,
pooling is not optimal Ckk
0 6= Ckk; this follows from the fact that the two types have, for
any ¾, di®erent probability distributions over earnings/signal combinations. Second, the self-
selection constraint for type k0 6= k is binding at an optimum: if it were not, then type k0 would
be o®ered zero consumption.
In general, voters will trade o® consumption risk for higher expected consumption. However,
as the fraction of any one type approaches unity, the optimal insurance contract that type would
choose for themselves approaches full insurance. This can be seen by considering Problem
(7) for k as µk approaches unity, i.e. when almost all agents have chosen e®ort hk. The
reason why type-k agents would choose for themselves a contract featuring consumption risk
is that doing so can relax the other type's self-selection constraint and allow them to obtain a
higher expected consumption; but as the fraction of type-k agents approaches unity the gain
to doing so vanishes. Thus, as µk approaches unity, the contract that type-k individuals choose
for themselves must approach a full-insurance contract. Moreover, because of the resource
constraint (1), the expected consumption for type-k agents must also converge to their expected
earnings, ¹wk. Thus ckkij (µ;¾) indeed approaches ¹w





j , for k
0 6= k. In words, Ákk0(¾) is the probability that a type-k0
agent sends a signal that is also sent with positive probability by a type-k agent. Since an
agent is revealed as being of type k0 if she sends a signal that is never sent by a type-k agent,
we say that the signal structure ¾ is at least as revealing as ¾^ for type k0 if Ákk0(¾) · Ákk0(¾^).
Given that an optimal contract for type k involves ckkij (µ;¾) = 0 whenever sj =2 S(hk)|a choice
of ckkij (µ;¾) > 0 for any such signal would have no direct e®ect on type k's continuation utility





(µ;¾)) approaches Ákk0(¾)u( ¹w
k) + (1 ¡ Ákk0(¾))u(0) ´ ¹vkk
0
(¾) as µk approaches unity.
Furthermore, it will always be optimal for type-k agents to o®er a full-insurance contract to
the other type, since a less-than-full insurance contract would again tighten the corresponding
self-selection constraint for any given level of expected consumption by type k0. Thus, as µk
approaches unity, the contract o®ered to k0 will feature ckk0ij (µ;¾) = ¹ckk
0
(¾) for all i; j, where
¹ckk
0






When µk is exactly one, all agents will vote for full insurance on all signals compatible with
e®ort hk. The `own' contract Ckk, on the other hand, is indeterminate for signals that are never
sent by type-k individuals (i.e. for sj =2 S(hk)); neither is a contract for the absent type, type
k0, determined. It is still useful, however, to assume that, when µk = 1, the agents vote for a
menu of contracts that coincides with the limit of Ck(µ;¾) as µk approaches unity, and features
ckkij = ¹w
k whenever sj 2 S(hk), ckkij = 0 otherwise, and ckk
0
ij = ¹c
kk0(¾), for all i; j.
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The menu Ck(µ;¾) induces continuation utilities vkk0(µ;¾) = vk0(Ckk0(µ;¾)) (for k0 = k and
for k0 6= k; as a convention, the ¯rst superscript in vkk0(µ;¾) will refer to the type casting
the vote and the second superscript to the type a®ected). Certain properties of continuation
utilities will be relevant for our subsequent analysis. First, each type k will always vote for a
menu that provides a higher continuation utility to her own type than to the other type:
Lemma 2 vkk(µ;¾)¡ vkk0(µ;¾) > 0 for all µ2 2 (0; 1) and all ¾ 2 §, k = 1; 2; and k0 6= k.
Second, how e®ectively a contract menu can discriminate between e®ort types clearly de-
pends on the extent to which private choices are observable ex post. Note that the `at least as
revealing' criterion cannot rank two information structures ¾ and ¾^ that are equally revealing
(Ák
0
k (¾) = Á
k0
k (¾^)) but di®er in the relative frequency with which a certain signal sj is sent
by the two e®ort types. A more general (and well-known) measure of informativeness is the
Blackwell criterion:
Definition 1 The signal structure ¾ = fS; f; qg is (Blackwell) more informative than ¾^ =
fS^; f^ ; q^g if there exists a Markov matrix [¯|^j ] such that, for each s|^ 2 S^, we have f^k|^ =P
sj2S ¯|^jf
k
j , for k = 1; 2.
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If ¾ is more informative than ¾^, it is also at least as revealing as ¾^ for both types, although
the converse is not necessarily the case. It can then be shown that the more informative is the
signal structure (in the sense just described) the higher is the continuation utility that the type
selecting the contract menu can secure for herself:
Lemma 3 If ¾ is more informative than ¾^, then vkk(µ;¾) ¸ vkk(µ; ¾^) for all µ2 2 (0; 1),
k = 1; 2:
4.1 Voting with Commitment to Signal Structures
We will start by considering the case where the agents can commit, at the ex ante stage, to a
(possibly degenerate) randomization over signal structures; we shall denote such a randomiza-
tion by ! 2 ­(§), where ­(§) is the space of probability distributions over §, and where !(¾)
represents the probability that ¾ 2 § is adopted. The expected cost of adopting a randomiza-
tion ! is then q! ´
P
¾2§ !(¾)q¾, and continuation utilities given ! can be written (slightly
abusing the notation) as vkk
0
(µ;!) ´ P¾2§ !(¾)vkk0(µ;¾), k; k0 = 1; 2. The probability of a
type-k0 agent sending a signal that is also sent by a type-k (k0 6= k) agent given a randomization





15A Markov matrix is a matrix with non-negative elements whose column sums equal unity. Note that the
binary relation `more informative than' is also generally not complete.
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The main results for the ex-ante adoption case can be summarized as follows. If agents
commit ex ante to a randomization ! that reveals a low-e®ort agent su±ciently often, then there
exists, conditional on !, a perfect pure-strategy high-e®ort equilibrium with full insurance.
Furthermore, there may exist, conditional on any randomization ! 2 ­ (§), mixed-strategy
equilibria in which a majority of agents choose high e®ort, although there will also always exist
a pure-strategy low-e®ort equilibrium. In general, the more informative is the adopted signal
structure the more e®ort can be supported. Consequently, the individuals may have a common
strategic incentive to pre-commit to an informative signal structure as long as it is not too costly.
Furthermore, with ex-ante adoption, an improvement in the economy's information technology
(represented by an expansion of the set of available signal structures, §) can only be welfare
improving as long as agents are able to coordinate on a Pareto-undominated equilibrium.
The timing of choices is as follows. Individuals ¯rst vote over randomizations ! 2 ­(§)
and the winning ! is observed by everyone. The agents then choose education e®orts, over
which they also can randomize. Next, the winning randomization ! is used to select a signal
structure ¾, which is put in place and is observed by everyone. After observing ¾ and their
own e®ort realizations, individuals vote over social insurance schemes. Finally, earnings and
signals are realized and taxes and transfers are carried out. The game can be solved backwards
by ¯rst considering outcomes conditional on a certain randomization !. In the continuation
game each agent ¯rst chooses a randomization over e®ort levels, and then, after observing her
own actual e®ort choice and a selected signal structure ¾, votes for a social insurance system.
A behavioural strategy for an agent in this continuation game consists of a probability of
choosing high e®ort, µ2 (with µ1 = 1¡ µ2), together with a rule describing how the agent will
vote in dependency of the combined realization of her own e®ort and of the signal structure. As
before, the relevant equilibrium concept is Nash (since there are no further proper subgames):
in equilibrium each agent holds correct beliefs about the other agents' actions and chooses a
strategy which is a best response to the other agents' behavioural strategies. And, as before,
we can apply a perfection re¯nement (although in this case the re¯nement has no e®ect on the
set of equilibrium outcomes).
We can start by noting the following:
Proposition 2 Conditional on any randomization over signal structures ! 2 ­ (§):
1. There exists a perfect pure-strategy Nash equilibrium where all agents choose low e®ort,
µ2 = 0.
2. There does not exist any Nash equilibrium where µ2 2 (0; 1=2).
Part 1 says that a pure-strategy low-e®ort equilibrium always exists, but does not rule
out the possibility of other equilibria being simultaneously present. Part 2 rules out a non-
zero size, high-e®ort minority in equilibrium. The reason for this is that a low-e®ort majority
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would vote for a social insurance system that leaves them with a higher continuation utility in
comparison with high-e®ort individuals; since e®ort is costly, this would also imply that low
e®ort dominates high e®ort from an ex-ante perspective, which in turn is inconsistent with
randomization between e®ort levels.
Next, we want to consider the possibility of a mixed-strategy continuation equilibrium
where µ2 2 (1=2; 1) and of a pure-strategy high-e®ort equilibrium, µ2 = 1. For there to be
an equilibrium where the agents randomize over e®ort levels, they must be indi®erent between
high and low e®ort. This is compatible with µ2 > 1=2, since when the high-e®ort agents are a
majority, the winning contract menu induces a larger continuation utility for high-e®ort agents
than for low-e®ort agents. Suppose then that all agents choose high e®ort with some probability
µ2 2 (1=2; 1). Holding correct beliefs about the distribution of types, high-e®ort agents vote for
C2 (µ;¾) when ¾ is selected; given the randomization !, this will induce continuation utilities
v22(µ;!) and v21(µ;!) for high- and low-e®ort agents respectively prior to the selection of ¾.
Then, if v22(µ;!) ¡ v21(µ;!) = g2 ¡ g1, there exists, conditional on !, a symmetric mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium where each agent exerts high e®ort with probability µ2. Since agents
randomize over e®orts, this equilibrium is also perfect:
Proposition 3 With interim voting over social insurance, any symmetric mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium with µ2 2 (1=2; 1) is a perfect equilibrium.
Thus, there may exist continuation equilibria where agents randomize over e®ort levels. Is
it then also possible that there exist pure-strategy high-e®ort equilibria? This is possible, but
requires that a low-e®ort agent be `revealed' su±ciently often. Note the intuition behind this:
if all agents choose the high e®ort, they will vote, in the interim, for full insurance over all
signals that are compatible with high e®ort. However, they can credibly vote for a very low
consumption level over all signals that are not compatible with high e®ort (and they will ¯nd
it optimal to do so). This discourages an agent from choosing low e®ort if the probability
of sending such signals is su±ciently high, Note that, if such an equilibrium exists, it is also
perfect, since a majority places no weight on the welfare of a minority.
Proposition 4 With interim voting over social insurance, there exists, conditional on a given
randomization over signal structures, ! 2 ­ (§), a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which all
agents choose high e®ort with probability one (µ2 = 1) if and only if
(u( ¹w2)¡ u(0))(1¡ Á21(!)) ¸ g2 ¡ g1:(9)
If the above inequality is strict, then this equilibrium is also perfect.
Thus, with commitment to signal structures, three types of symmetric continuation equi-
libria are possible: a low-e®ort equilibrium, a mixed-strategy equilibrium where individuals
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choose high e®ort with a probability greater than 1/2, and a high-e®ort equilibrium. The sym-
metric high-e®ort equilibrium requires that low-e®ort agents be sometimes fully revealed, i.e.
it requires quite a lot of observability.
These results suggest that the maximum amount of e®ort (measured as the fraction of
agents choosing high e®ort) which can be supported by a signal structure is related to its level
of informativeness. Suppose that the more informative is the adopted signal structure the
larger is the di®erence in the continuation utilities of the type choosing the contract menu and
of the other type, i.e. suppose that vkk(µ;¾) ¡ vkk0(µ;¾) is weakly increasing (for each k and
µ) in the informativeness of ¾.16 Consider then two signal structures ¾ and ¾^, where ¾ is more
informative than ¾^. From Proposition 4, ¾^ supports a high-e®ort equilibrium if and only if¡
u( ¹w2)¡ u(0)¢ ¡1¡ Á21(¾^)¢ ¸ g2 ¡ g1. Also, recall that when ¾ is more informative than ¾^ it
is also at least as revealing for type 1 (Á21(¾) · Á21(¾^)). Hence if ¾^ supports a pure-strategy
high-e®ort equilibrium, ¾ does so too. On the other hand, if ¾^ does not support any high e®ort
at all, then ¾ cannot support less e®ort. Finally, suppose that ¾^ supports a mixed strategy
equilibrium with µ > 1=2. Then, as shown in Figure 1 (where ¢v2(µ;¾) ´ v22(µ;¾)¡ v21(µ;¾),
and ¢g ´ g2¡ g1), ¾ will either support a mixed-strategy equilibrium with a larger fraction of






Figure 1: If a more informative signal structure shifts the locus ¢v2 ´ v22(µ;¾) ¡ v21(µ;¾)
upwards, it supports more e®ort.
16Since type-k agents are voting to maximize their own continuation utility with no direct concern for type-k0
agents, this is plausible. Note, however, that it is not implied by Lemma 3.
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This conclusion generalizes to random signal structures in a straightforward manner: as
more weight is placed on the more informative signal structure ¾ and less on ¾^, the largest µ2
that can be supported in equilibrium will not decrease.
Let us now move back to the ¯rst stage of the game, where the choice of a signal structure
(or a randomization over signal structures) is made. Although there can be multiple symmetric
continuation equilibria for any given !, in each of these equilibria utility is the same across
individuals. Then, being identical ex ante, they will unanimously select a randomization over
signal structures for which the expected continuation utility is maximal (which may or may
not be the randomization that induces the largest e®ort). If the agents can coordinate on
undominated continuation equilibria for any given ¾, a given expected level of equilibrium
e®ort will always be induced in the cheapest possible way through an appropriate choice of !.
For example, if a uniform choice of low e®ort is to be induced, the null signal structure will be
adopted; on the other hand, if a uniform choice of high e®ort is to be induced, then the agents
will choose an ! which just supports a pure-strategy high-e®ort outcome but minimizes cost
(e.g., by placing some positive weight on ¾0).
We close our discussion of the case with commitment to signal structures by noting that
an improvement in the economy's information technology|which can be represented by an
expansion in the set of available signal structures, §|can never decrease welfare provided
that agents can coordinate on Pareto-undominated equilibria. The result follows from the
fact that the agents commit to a signal structure while they are still identical: an expansion
of the set of available signal structures from § to §0, § ½ §0, increases the agents' choice
set at the adoption stage; if, for any given ¾, they can coordinate on a Pareto-undominated
continuation equilibrium, then, being identical at the ex-ante stage, they will unanimously
select a randomization ! 2 ­(§) which maximizes ex-ante welfare; then, an enlargement of the
set of available signal structures must be (weakly) welfare improving.17
Proposition 5 With interim voting over social insurance and commitment to signal struc-
tures at the ex ante stage, an improvement in the economy's information technology weakly
increases welfare.
17Formally, let £(!) denote the set of e®ort distributions that can be supported in a continuation equilibrium
given !; then the maximum ex ante expected utility that can be achieved in equilibrium through an appropriate












where k (µ) is the major-
ity type, i.e. k (µ) = 1 if µ2 < 1=2 and k (µ) = 2 otherwise. Then we conclude that this maximum utility can
only be increased when § is expanded to §0, § ½ §0, and thus the choice set is expanded from ­ (§) to ­ (§0).
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4.2 Voting without Commitment to Signal Structures
The previous analysis leaves us with the doubt that commitment to signal structures may
simply serve as a substitute for commitment to social insurance. Can signal structures play a
positive role even if they cannot be committed to prior to the agents exerting e®ort? Or stated
slightly di®erently, is commitment to information crucial when commitment to insurance is not
feasible?
We shall show that without commitment to signal structures there cannot exist a pure-
strategy high-e®ort equilibrium. However, as in the case of ex-ante adoption of signal structures,
there may exist, depending on the information technology, symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria
that dominate the pure-strategy low-e®ort equilibrium. Thus, the availability of information
about private e®ort choices may help support more e±cient outcomes even when the decision
to procure such information is made concurrently with the choice of a social insurance system
at the interim stage. Nevertheless, although equilibrium e®ort with commitment to signal
structures can be more or less than without commitment, welfare without commitment can
be no larger than welfare with commitment. Finally, unlike in the ex-ante adoption case,
with interim adoption an improvement in the information technology may increase or decrease
welfare.
The timing of choices is as follows. First, agents choose e®ort, where they may randomize.
After observing their own e®ort realizations, they vote over policy `packages'|or a random-
ization over such packages|where each package consists of a social insurance scheme and an
accompanying signal structure. Finally, a policy package, selected using the winning random-
ization, is implemented, whereafter earnings and signals are realized and taxes and transfers
are carried out.18 A behavioural strategy for an agent consists of a probability, µ2, of choosing
high e®ort, and a rule for how to vote for a policy package (or for a randomization over pack-
ages) contingent on her own realized e®ort type. The relevant solution concept is again Nash
equilibrium, possibly perfected.
It is easy to see that there can never exist a symmetric pure-strategy high-e®ort equilibrium.
If all agents did choose high e®ort, then each agent would, holding correct beliefs about the
other agents' e®ort choices and voting sincerely, vote for full insurance, and no agent would
favour adopting any costly signal structure. Hence the uninformative signal structure ¾0 would
be selected and each agent would be o®ered a constant consumption level ¹w2; but then low e®ort
would dominate high e®ort for all agents. The problem is that in order to uphold a high-e®ort
equilibrium, costly information is needed to detect deviators; but if all agents actually do choose
high e®ort, then in the interim they will not have any incentive to procure information. This is
18Alternatively, voting could be assumed to be sequential with voting taking place ¯rst over signal structures
and then over social insurance.
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a very general observation: if an equilibrium is going to be upheld by costly information, there
has to be, in that equilibrium, a return to actually procuring the information (Grossman and
Stiglitz, 1980). Such a return only exists when there is interim heterogeneity; hence, equilibria
in which costly information is procured must be mixed-strategy equilibria.
Proposition 6 With interim voting over signal structures and social insurance, there never
exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium where all individuals choose high e®ort, µ2 = 1.
In parallel to the case with commitment, we can show the following:
Proposition 7 With interim voting over signal structures and social insurance:
1. There exists a perfect Nash equilibrium where all agents choose low e®ort, µ2 = 0;
2. There never exists a Nash equilibrium with µ2 2 (0; 1=2).
Thus, if any agent is going to exert high e®ort, there will have to be a mixed-strategy
equilibrium where the majority of agents at the interim stage are of the high-e®ort type. Such
an equilibrium has to satisfy two conditions: ¯rst, any adopted policy package has to be optimal
in the interim from the point of view of the high-e®ort agents, and second, all agents must be
ex-ante indi®erent between high and low e®ort.
Given a signal structure ¾ 2 § and beliefs µ about the distribution of e®ort types, the
menu of contracts that maximizes the high-e®ort type's continuation utility is C2(µ;¾), and
the continuation utility achieved by the high-e®ort agents is v22(µ;¾). When voting sincerely
to maximize her own continuation utility, a high-e®ort individual will therefore vote for a
randomization ! 2 ­(§) which maximizes v22(µ;!) ¡ q!. Consider then a combination of
randomization over e®orts eµ, with ~µ2 2 (1=2; 1), and randomization over signal structures ~!
satisfying
(i) ~! 2 argmax
!2­(§)
v22(~µ;!)¡ q!, and (ii) v22(~µ; ~!)¡ v21(~µ; ~!) = g2 ¡ g1:(10)
With agents holding consistent beliefs about the interim distribution of types, condition (i)
guarantees that it is optimal for high-e®ort agents to vote for the policy package
¡
¾;C2(µ;¾)¢
to be adopted with probability ~!(¾); this in turn will induce continuation utilities v22(~µ; ~!) and
v21(~µ; ~!). Given (ii) each agent is then indi®erent between choosing high and low e®ort at the
ex-ante stage, and it is therefore an optimal response to choose high e®ort with probability ~µ
2
.
As in the ex-ante adoption case, this Nash equilibrium is also perfect since agents are strictly
randomizing over e®ort levels:
Proposition 8 With interim voting over signal structures and social insurance, any symmet-
ric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium with µ2 2 (1=2; 1) and ! 2 ­(§) is a perfect equilibrium.
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Absent commitment to signal structures, there can be two types of equilibria; there always
exists a symmetric pure-strategy low-e®ort equilibrium, but there may also exist mixed-strategy
equilibria with a high-e®ort majority. Since agents are ex-ante identical, if there are multiple
equilibria, they will all agree on which one is the best for them (just as in the case with
commitment to signal structures); we will therefore assume that if there are multiple equilibria,
agents are able to coordinate on a Pareto-undominated equilibrium.
Thus, ex-ante commitment to a costly signal structure is not crucial in order for interim
majority voting over social insurance schemes to be e®ective as an enforcement mechanism and
support an e®ort choice in excess of µ2 = 0. Commitment to an information technology will
nevertheless always be desirable in the sense that expected welfare will always be at least
as high with it as without it. To see this, note that a lack of commitment with respect
to signal structures can be thought of as imposing the additional renegotiation constraint
that the selected signal structure be optimal for the majority group in the interim. It then
trivially follows that whatever outcome obtains without commitment can also be obtained with
commitment: the agents simply need to commit to the same signal structure at the ex-ante
stage.
The pro-interim-majority bias in the selection of signal structures must be met, in equilib-
rium, by an adjustment in the level of e®ort. In general, as will be illustrated in the numerical
examples below, the e®ect of this bias on equilibrium e®ort is ambiguous:
Proposition 9 With interim voting over social insurance, lack of commitment to a signal
structure can increase or decrease expected e®ort compared to the case with commitment. How-
ever, welfare without commitment to a signal structure is no larger than welfare with commit-
ment.
Given the additional renegotiation constraint that the signal structure must be optimal
for the majority type in the interim, we can no longer conclude that an improvement in the
economy's information technology (represented by an expansion of §) will unambiguously im-
prove welfare, unless it takes a special form. For example, a general decrease in the cost of
information which reduces q! for all ! 2 ­(§) will necessarily be good for welfare as long as
the cost reduction for the randomization initially adopted in equilibrium is at least as large
as that for the other feasible randomization (which will be always the case for example, with
an equi-proportional reduction in all q¾s). This condition guarantees that there is still, after
the cost reduction, an equilibrium with the same expected e®ort and where the same signal
structure is adopted (though this equilibrium need not be Pareto-undominated after the cost
reduction).
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4.3 Opting out of Social Insurance
So far we have only required social insurance contracts to guarantee a nonnegative consumption
level to each agent in every state. However, it may be that the contracts on o®er leave some
agents worse o® than if they were to `go it alone' without any insurance. Since the mechanism
through which e®ort can be supported by interim majority voting relies crucially on the ma-
jority's ability to redistribute resources in their own direction via the social insurance scheme,
one might conjecture that the possibility of opting out of the scheme will restrict the power
of `enforcement' and hence the e®ort that can be sustained in equilibrium.19 In this section
we will examine how the results of our previous analysis are a®ected by the introduction of
participation constraints.
At the interim stage, after e®ort choices are realized, the (reservation) expected continuation
utility for a type-k agent who opts out of social insurance is v^k ´Pi ¼ki u (wi), k = 1; 2, where
by assumption v^2 > v^1.20 It is easy to show that a type-k majority can never gain from inducing
type k0 to opt out:
Lemma 4 It is never optimal for any type k, k = 1; 2, to induce the other type, k0, to opt out;
furthermore, when a type-k majority chooses social insurance, her continuation utility exceeds
the corresponding interim reservation value, i.e. vkk (µ;¾) > v^k, for all µ2 2 (0; 1), ¾ 2 § and
k = 1; 2.
Then, if agents can opt out of social insurance, we must incorporate the following participation





) ¸ v^k0 , k0 6= k.(11)
Note that this also implies that no agent will opt out at any stage of the game.
The immediate e®ects of adding participation constraints is that we can no longer be sure
about whether it will be the self-selection constraint or the participation constraint for type
k0 that will be binding in an optimal contract menu. Furthermore, we cannot be sure that
the continuation utility that type-1 agents intend for themselves, v11 (µ;¾), exceeds that which
they intend for type 2, v12 (µ;¾). This, however, will not a®ect our results in any substantial
way because a weaker version of Lemma 2 still holds:
19It could be argued that when opting out at the interim stage is infeasible, the enforcement power of voting-
based renegotiation goes beyond what can be rationalized on the basis of individual incentives to voluntarily
participate in a social insurance arrangement. Thus, regardless of whether or not it may be realistic to assume
that agents can opt out of social insurance, whether high-e®ort equilibria can be supported with interim opting
out appears to be a theoretically relevant question.
20For simplicity we assume that an agent can never avoid the cost associated with the adopted signal structure,
q¾, by opting out.
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Lemma 5 If the participation constraint (11) is incorporated into Problem (7), continuation
utilities satisfy the following inequalities (when k = 1 and k = 2 respectively):
1. v11 (µ;¾)¡ v12 (µ;¾) > g1 ¡ g2 for all µ2 2 (0; 1) and ¾ 2 §;
2. v22 (µ;¾)¡ v21 (µ;¾) > 0 for all µ2 2 (0; 1) and ¾ 2 §.
Invoking this result in place of Lemma 2|and re-writing the condition in Proposition 4 as
u( ¹w2)¡maxfu( ¹w2)Á21(!)+u(0)(1¡Á21(!)); v^1g ¸ g2¡g1|all of our previous results generalize to
the case where opting out is possible. Thus, the possibility of opting out of social insurance does
not alter our main conclusion that interim renegotiation of social insurance through majority
voting can help support higher level of e®ort in comparison with social planning|even when
individuals are ex-ante identical.
This does not mean, however, that the participation constraints will have no e®ect. For
example, achieving a pure-strategy high-e®ort equilibrium (Proposition 4) relies on a low-e®ort
`deviator' being revealed su±ciently often and, if revealed, being provided with a low level of
consumption. But if opting out is possible, the deviator's continuation utility must be at least
v^1 no matter how revealing the adopted signal structure is. This clearly imposes restrictions on
the set of signal structures that can support a pure-strategy high-e®ort equilibrium under ex-
ante adoption: high e®ort cannot be induced by adopting a `very revealing' signal structure with
a low probability. What is needed is that su±ciently revealing signal structures are adopted
with a larger probability. Also, by restricting the di®erence v22(µ;¾)¡ v21(µ;¾), participation
constraints may a®ect the expected level of e®ort that can be supported in a mixed-strategy
equilibrium. But one can easily think of scenarios where participation constraints will have
little or no e®ect on the outcome. For example, in a scenario where w1 = 0, ¼
1
1 is close to unity,
and individuals are in¯nitely risk averse, the participation constraint for low-e®ort types will
never be binding.
Even though one may suspect that participation constraints may be bad for welfare because
they restrict the power of the interim majority, this cannot be shown to hold in general. In the
case with commitment to signal structures we cannot immediately conclude that the outcome
with participation constraints can be replicated by a suitable ex-ante choice of signal structures
when the participation constraints are removed. In the case where there is no commitment,
the power of the interim majority cannot be harnessed by an appropriate ex-ante choice of
signal structures, and interim participation constraints that restrict this power may be good
for welfare.
4.4 An Illustration
The implications of renegotiation by majority rule, and the various equilibria that can arise
depending on the signal structures available and the timing of their adoption, are best illustrated
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by means of a parameterized example.
Let u(c) = ln c, w1 = 1, w2 = 10, g
1 = 0, g2 = 1, ¼11 = 0:8 and ¼
2
1 = 0:2. Since ln 0 is not
de¯ned, we shall assume the minimum level of consumption c to be equal to 0:001 rather than
0. One can verify that this parameterization satis¯es the assumption in (2).
Under social planning, the unique equilibrium (irrespective of the set of available signal
structures and of the timing of the adoption of signal structures) involves uniform low e®ort,
µ2 = 0, a constant level of consumption 2:8, and a level of ex-ante expected welfare equal to
1:03.
With interim voting, consider ¯rst a scenario where, besides the uninformative signal struc-
ture, ¾0, there is a signal structure ¾
0 consisting of two informative, but not revealing, signals:
a signal s1, sent by low-e®ort agents with probability 0:8 and by high-e®ort agents with proba-
bility 0:2, and a signal s2 being sent by low-e®ort agents with probability 0:8 and by high-e®ort
agents with probability 0:2 (the reverse pattern from s1); the cost of ¾
0 is q¾0 = 0:05. In this
scenario the undominated Nash equilibrium with commitment involves !(¾0) = 0:72, which
supports a mixed-strategy e®ort choice µ2 = 0:92. The associated level of ex-ante expected wel-
fare is equal to 1:24.21 With no revealing signals, a pure high-e®ort equilibrium is not feasible.
In equilibrium, if the informative signal structure is adopted, the interim high-e®ort majority
selects a menu of contract which relies on the informative signals: it provides full-insurance
for the low-e®ort type with a constant consumption level of 2:17, while the high-e®ort agents
select for themselves a contract with c2111 = 1:23, c
22
12 = 8:37, c
22
21 = 8:01, c
22
22 = 8:46. Note that
the high-e®ort agents choose to face some residual consumption uncertainty in order to induce
low-e®ort agents to self-select. If the null signal structure is adopted, screening can still take
place: the low-e®ort minority is o®ered a full-insurance contract with a constant consumption
level of 6:47, and the high-e®ort majority again choose partial insurance for themselves, with
c221 = 6:08 and c
22
2 = 8:31. In this example the interim participation constraint for the low-e®ort
type is slack in equilibrium whether or not the informative structure is adopted.
In the same scenario, absent commitment to signal structures, there exists a mixed-strategy
equilibrium where ¾0 is adopted with probability one (!(¾0) = 1) and e®ort is µ2 = 0:89.
The associated social insurance scheme exhibits the same pattern as for the ex-ante adoption
case: full insurance for the low-e®ort type, and less-than-full insurance for the high-e®ort type.
This equilibrium, however, is dominated: ex-ante welfare is 0:98, less than in a pure-strategy
low-e®ort equilibrium.
Consider next an alternative scenario where ¾0 is not available, but where there exists
another signal structure, ¾00, having the same cost q¾00 = 0:05 but featuring fully revealing
signals s3 and s4, each sent, with probability 0:2, exclusively by low- and high-e®ort agents
respectively; in addition there is an uninformative signal, s5, sent by both types with probability
21All numerical results have been obtained using iterative methods in conjunction with numerical optimization.
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0:4; the two informative but non-revealing signals s1 and s2 are also present: s1 is now sent
by low-e®ort agents with probability 0:3 and by high-e®ort agents with probability 0:1, and s2
is sent by low-e®ort agents with probability 0:1 and by high-e®ort agents with probability 0:3.
In this case, the undominated Nash equilibrium with commitment to signal structures involves
all agents choosing high e®ort, µ2 = 1, with ¾00 being adopted with probability !(¾00) = 0:61,
which results in a level of ex-ante welfare equal to 1:07. The equilibrium contract menu in
the presence of the informative signal structure makes use of the revealing signals: in their
`own' contract, high-e®ort agents attach the minimum consumption level c to signal s3 (which
is never sent by a high-e®ort agent), and a constant consumption level of 8:21 to all other
outcomes. Potential low-e®ort deviators are o®ered a full-insurance contract with a constant
level of consumption of 1:59, which leaves them at their interim reservation utility level.
For the same parameterization but without commitment to signal structures, there exists
a mixed-strategy outcome with !(¾00) = 1, µ2 = 0:93, and a level of ex-ante welfare equal to
1:02. Again, this equilibrium is dominated by the pure-strategy low-e®ort equilibrium. As in
the commitment case, low-e®ort agents are o®ered a full-insurance contract with a constant
consumption level of 1:59. However, since there is now a fraction µ1 = 0:07 of low-e®ort agents
in the interim, the high-e®ort majority can pro¯t from providing insurance to them, and achieve
for themselves a full-insurance outcome with a consumption level equal to 8:23|higher than
in the ex-ante adoption case. Note that even if there is a non-zero fraction of low-e®ort agents
in the interim, the presence of a fully revealing signal s3 makes it possible for the high-e®ort
majority to force low-e®ort agents down to their reservation utility without having to impose
any consumption risk on themselves.
If only the null signal structure is available, there exists a dominated mixed-strategy equi-
librium with µ2 = 0:54, yielding a level of ex-ante welfare equal to 0:96. Thus it is still possible,
albeit not desirable in this example, to support an e®ort choice in excess of µ2 = 0 even when
no informative signals are available.
In all of the above examples, the availability of an informative signal structure alongside
the null structure, ¾0, raises welfare only in scenarios where commitment to an information
technology is feasible. If, on the other hand, the cost of adoption is small enough, welfare
increases in all cases. For example, if we reduce the cost of ¾0 and ¾00 from 0:05 to 0:01, welfare
in equilibrium exceeds 1:03 in all scenarios.
5 Discussion
The results of the preceding analysis show that renegotiation of a social contract by majority
rule can help overcome the problems that arise from a lack of policy commitment. This is
because, when there is interim heterogeneity, a majority will support a choice that entails a
transfer of resources to themselves, which makes belonging to the interim majority type more
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attractive ex ante. Public information about private choices can play a key supporting role in
this respect: the more observable private choices are, the easier it is for the majority to extract
a surplus from the minority by conditioning taxes and transfers on signals that are correlated
with actions. Because of the value of public information in this context, both from the ex-ante
point of view of a representative individual and from the point of view of an interim majority,
it may be worthwhile for agents to invest in costly information technologies if such option is
open to them, independently of whether the choice to invest in information takes place before
or after private e®ort choices are made. Thus, voting-based interim renegotiation can make
it possible to support high levels of e®ort even when pre-commitment to a signal structure is
not feasible. These results are in stark contrast to those obtained when the social contract is
determined by a social planner, where a lack of policy commitment eliminates any incentive to
exert e®ort.
The mechanism we have described relies centrally on the `quasi-dictatorial' nature of ma-
jority voting, whereby the minority's preferences are given no weight in collective choices. This
is the very feature that makes majority voting a potentially ine±cient procedure in a static
context; in the renegotiation scenario we have described, this °aw becomes a virtue. The `en-
forcement' role played by majority rule in the presence of renegotiation bears some conceptual
similarity to the idea of social norms promoting conformism (Akerlof, 1980); what makes it
distinct is that with voting-based renegotiation the pressure to conform to the choices of others
does not come from an exogenous norm, but is channelled through the very social contract that
is the source of the ine±cient private behaviour, a contract to which participation may be fully
voluntary.
Although our analysis has focused exclusively on direct democracy, a mechanism similar to
the one we have described would also be at work under a representative democratic system. To
see why, consider a setting where a policymaker is elected at the ex-ante stage after e®ort choices
but before individuals learn about their e®ort type, and suppose that the elected policymaker
can commit to social insurance at that stage. Then she will commit to a contract menu
that maximizes her own expected welfare given her own mixed-strategy; but in a symmetric
equilibrium her e®ort choice will coincide with everyone else's strategy, and the result will be
a (constrained) e±cient arrangement. Suppose instead that the policymaker, still elected at
the ex-ante stage, cannot commit to social insurance at that stage but selects a contract menu
after observing her own e®ort type. Then, again, a renegotiation problem arises, the structure
of which, however, will be closer to the majority voting case than to the social planning case.
Depending on her interim realized e®ort type, the elected policymaker will behave either like
a low-e®ort majority or like high-e®ort majority; if µ2 is large, the latter outcome will be
relatively more likely, which in turn will make it relatively more attractive to choose high
e®ort|analogously to what takes place in the direct democracy case. A similar story could
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also be told with reference to a scenario where the policymaker is elected at the interim stage.22
The general conclusion from our analysis is thus that the welfare implications of renegotia-
tion, and the related implications for the desirability of public information under a democratic
procedure|be it direct democracy or representative democracy|can be quite di®erent from
those under bargaining or social planning. Given that the policy choices for which commitment
has been described in the literature as being problematic are typically based on democratic
procedures, we feel that this divergence is worth stressing.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Note ¯rst that agents cannot randomize over e®ort levels in equilibrium;
if they did, the planner's best response would be to o®er a single full-insurance contract, cij =
µ1 ¹w1 + µ2 ¹w2 for all i; j. But the ex-ante expected utility from choosing low e®ort would then
exceed that from choosing high e®ort, which is inconsistent with randomization. There do,
however, exist Nash equilibria in which all agents choose low e®ort. To see this, note that if
all agents choose h1, the planner's best response is to o®er a single contract with cij = ¹w
1
whenever sj 2 S(h1) (for sj =2 S(h1) the contract is indeterminate); then h1 is indeed a best
response for all agents. We shall show that this equilibrium is also perfect. Require each agent
to choose each action with at least some (small) probability ", and suppose that each agent
then chooses µ1 = 1 ¡ "; the planner's best response is then a single full-insurance contract
cij = (1¡ ") ¹w1 + " ¹w2 for all i; j; given this contract it is indeed a best response for each agent
to make the probability of choosing h1 as large as possible. These choices constitute the unique
Nash equilibrium in the perturbed economy; moreover, as " goes to zero, the Nash equilibrium
in the perturbed economy converges to the Nash equilibrium in the original economy where all
agents choose h1 with probability one and the planner o®ers cij = ¹w1 for all i; j. Finally, it
can be shown that if ¾ is su±ciently revealing for type 1, then there also exist pure-strategy
Nash equilibria in which agents choose h2; but from the above analysis it is clear that such an
equilibrium cannot be perfect. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2. For concreteness let the type selecting the menu be k = 1 (the case
with k = 2 is fully symmetrical). Note ¯rst that the self-selection constraint for type 2 must
bind at an optimum, otherwise type 2 would be o®ered zero consumption on all earnings-signal
combinations|a direct contradiction. The self-selection constraint for type 1 will always be
slack at an optimum. To see this, suppose that ¾ o®ers no revealing signals (S(h1) = S(h2) =
22A form of the mechanism described here would also be present in a setting with ex-ante heterogeneity; the
analysis of the heterogeneous case, however, adds a number of complications and is beyond the scope of the
present paper.
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S), and solve problem (7) ignoring the self-selection constraint for type 1. The solution will
then have the following features: (i) type 2 is provided with a full-insurance contract, c12ij = ¹c
12
for all i; j (whereby v2(C12) = v1(C12) = u(¹c12)), and (ii) type 1 is provided with an incomplete
insurance contract which o®ers relatively large consumption on earnings-signal combinations
that are relatively likely for type 1, c11ij ¸ c11{^|^ if and only if (¼1i f1j )=(¼2i f2j ) ¸ (¼1{^ f1|^ )=(¼2{^ f2|^ ). Note
that some of these inequalities will be strict since the two types' earnings-signal distributions
di®er. From this and the fact that the self-selection constraint is binding on type 2, it follows
that type 1 strictly prefers C11 to C12, v1(C11) > v1(C12) = u(¹c12), i.e. the self-selection
constraint is automatically slack. Combining these observations then gives the desired result:
v11(µ;¾) ´ v1(C11) > u(¹c12) = v2(C12) ´ v12(µ;¾). Finally, if ¾ is such that some signals are
revealing, then type 1 will o®er c11ij = 0 whenever j =2 S(h1), while it is still optimal to o®er
type 2 a full-insurance contract, c12ij = ¹c
12 for all i; j. The same argument then applies. ¤
Proof of Lemma 3. The argument follows Grossman and Hart (1983) (see also HolmstrÄom,
1979). Since ¾ is more informative than ¾^, there exists a Markov matrix [¯|^j] such that for




j , k = 1; 2. The solution to problem (7) given ¾^ involves one
contract, C^kk, which provides consumption c^kki|^ on (wi; s|^), and a second contract, C^
kk0 , which
o®ers constant consumption, ¹c. Suppose then that when ¾ is available, type k votes for a menu
(Ckk; Ckk
0
), where, conditional on (wi; sj), C
kk o®ers consumption c^kki|^ with probability ¯|^j , and
Ckk
0
o®ers a constant consumption ¹c on all earnings and signals. If a type-l agent, l = 1; 2, picks










|^ , while if she picks C
kk0 she receives
the guaranteed consumption ¹c. This means that by using stochastic contracts the allocation
chosen by type k when the less informative signal structure ¾^ is adopted can be perfectly
replicated when the more informative signals structure ¾ is adopted. Consequently, vk(µ;¾) ¸
vk(µ; ¾^). The outcome can be further improved whenever Ckk involves stochastic contracts,





if Ckk is replaced with a non-stochastic contract eCkk that o®ers the same utility on each




i|^ ) for all i; j, type k's utility is unchanged (while keeping
the self-selection constraint satis¯ed), but expected consumption is less; this relaxes the budget
constraint, which in turn allows for a further improvement. From this, we can also conclude
that adopting stochastic contracts as just described can never be optimal. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. Part (1). Suppose all agents choose h1 and that ¾ is adopted.
Holding correct beliefs, each agent then optimally votes for the menu C1((1; 0);¾) and obtains
an ex-ante expected payo® u( ¹w1) ¡ g1 ¡ q¾. An agent who deviates and chooses h2 obtains
the guaranteed consumption ¹c12(¾) de¯ned in (8) (the full-insurance contract C12 induces the
deviator to self-select) and thus an ex-ante expected payo® u(¹c12(¾))¡ g2 ¡ q¾. But from (8)
it follows that ¹c12(¾) · ¹w1; moreover g2 > g1; hence the agent is better o® not deviating.
Since this holds for every ¾, there is, conditional on any ! 2 ­(§), a Nash equilibrium where
all agents choose h1 with probability one and vote for C1((1; 0);¾) when ¾ is adopted. This
equilibrium is also perfect. Require each agent to choose each e®ort level with at least some
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small probability ", and suppose that each agent chooses µ1 = 1 ¡ ". A type-k agent then
optimally votes for Ck((1¡ "; ");¾) when ¾ is adopted. Since " is small, low-e®ort agents are
in majority, and by Lemma 2 the induced continuation utility for a low-e®ort agent exceeds
that for a high-e®ort agent, v11((1 ¡ "; ");¾) > v12((1 ¡ "; ");¾). Since this holds for every
¾ 2 §, the ranking of continuation utilities extends to any ! 2 ­(§); moreover, since g2 > g1
it also extends to ex-ante utilities. Hence it is a best response for each agent to make the
probability of choosing h1 as large as possible. These choices constitute a Nash equilibrium for
the perturbed economy; moreover, as " approaches zero, this Nash equilibrium in the perturbed
economy approaches the symmetric low-e®ort equilibrium in the original economy.
Part (2). Suppose the agents randomize over e®ort levels with µ1 2 (0:5; 1), and suppose
that ¾ is adopted. In the interim, a type-k agent voting sincerely then optimally votes for
Ck(µ;¾), whereby C1(µ;¾) is the winning menu. The continuation utility for a low-e®ort agent
then exceeds that for a high-e®ort agent, v11(µ;¾) > v12(µ;¾) (Lemma 2). Since this holds for
every ¾ 2 §, the ranking extends to every ! 2 ­(§); moreover, since g2 > g1 it also extends to
ex-ante utilities; but this contradicts that the agents optimally randomize over e®ort levels. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose all agents choose h2 with probability one. Each agent then
optimally votes for C2((0; 1);¾) when ¾ is adopted, which generates ex-ante utility u( ¹w2)¡g2¡q¾
for each agent. An agent who instead deviates and chooses h1 obtains the guaranteed consump-
tion ¹c21(¾) de¯ned in (8) (which by design induces the deviator to self-select). Straightforward
calculations then show that, prior to the selection of ¾ by the randomization !, an agent is better
o® not deviating if and only if (9) holds. To see that this equilibrium is also perfect, suppose all
agents choose high e®ort with maximum probability, µ2 = 1¡ ". Each type-k agent then votes
for Ck(("; 1¡ ");¾) when ¾ is adopted. When (9) is satis¯ed with inequality, the continuation
utilities conditional on !, by continuity, satisfy v22(("; 1¡ ");!)¡ v21(("; 1¡ ");!) > g2 ¡ g1;
hence it optimal for each agent to make the probability of choosing h2 as large as possible.
Moreover, as " approaches zero, this Nash equilibrium in the perturbed economy approaches
the Nash equilibrium in the original economy. Finally, noting that C21 is the contract that is
least likely to induce deviations from a symmetric high-e®ort equilibrium (since it assigns zero
consumption on signals that are not compatible with high e®ort) it follows that when (9) fails,
no symmetric high-e®ort equilibrium can be sustained. ¤
Proof of Proposition 7. Part (1). Suppose all agents choose h1 with probability one. Each
agent, holding correct beliefs and voting sincerely, then optimally votes for ¾0 to be adopted
with probability one (in order to avoid signal costs), and for the menu C1((1; 0);¾0) to be
implemented, which simply o®ers all agents the guaranteed consumption ¹w1. This is a Nash
equilibrium, which is also perfect: suppose all agents make the probability of choosing low e®ort
as large as possible, i.e. µ1 = 1¡"; given that " is arbitrarily small, in the interim, all low-e®ort
agents optimally vote for ¾0 to be adopted (since it is not worthwhile to adopt a costly signal
structure in order to better identify the few high-e®ort agents) and for the menu C1((1¡"; ");¾0);
this gives a higher continuation utility to low-e®ort agents, v11((1¡"; ");¾0) > v12((1¡"; ");¾0)
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(Lemma 2), and, since g2 > g1, also a higher ex-ante utility; thus it is indeed optimal for each
agent to make the probability of choosing h1 as large as possible. As " approaches zero, this
Nash equilibrium in the perturbed economy converges to the Nash equilibrium in the original
economy.
Part (2). The argument is the same as in Proposition 2: if there is, in the interim, a
low-e®ort majority, they will vote, sincerely, for a menu of contracts that gives them a higher
continuation utility than it does to high-e®ort agents (Lemma 2), no matter which ¾ is adopted.
But, since g2 > g1, this implies that the ex-ante utility from choosing low e®ort exceeds the
ex-ante utility from choosing high e®ort, which is inconsistent with randomization over e®ort
levels. ¤
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider ¯rst type 1. If type 2 opts out, type 1 can at best achieve
the continuation utility u( ¹w1); but this can also be achieved while ensuring that type 2 do
not opt out, e.g. by o®ering the following two contracts: full insurance at the level ¹w1 and
a `no-insurance' contract, cij = wi for all i; j; type 2 then opts in and type 1 achieves utility
u( ¹w1) > v^1 no matter which contract type 2 selects. Consider then type 2. Note ¯rst that,
v22(µ;¾) must always exceed v^2: type-2 agents can o®er type 1 full insurance at their reservation
level v^1, while o®ering themselves a contract with no insurance at all, cij = wi for all i; j; all
agents then participate and self-select; type 2 achieve their reservation utility v^2, and the
budget constraint slack remains slack. The same argument shows that type 2 can never gain
by inducing type 1 to opt out: type 1 opts out if the contract(s) currently o®ered give them a
lower continuation utility than v^1; type 2 can then o®er type 1 full insurance at their reservation
level. This induces type 1 to participate and generates a budget surplus without violating self-
selection. ¤
Proof of Lemma 5. Consider ¯rst k = 1. We can focus on the case where the participation
constraint for type 2 is binding at an optimum, v12(µ;¾) = v^2 (or else the argument in Lemma 2
applies). By Lemma 4, v11(µ;¾) ¸ u( ¹w1); the result then follows immediately from assumption
(2) (which states that u( ¹w1) ¡ g1 > v^2 ¡ g2). Consider then k = 2. Focusing on the case
where the participation constraint binds for type 1, v21(µ;¾) = v^1, we need only note that,
from Lemma 4, v22(µ;¾) ¸ v^2; the result then follows immediately from the ranking v^2 > v^1.
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